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Abstract 
The article explores the theoretical and empirical relationship between user choice and 
democratic participation. Based in an individually centered perspective on democracy, the 
article asks to what extent user choice, a core element in marketization reforms, among 
citizens and local government leaders is understood as a means to realize individual pref-
erences. Empirically, the article focuses on elderly care and primary school education in 
Sweden and Norway, and follows a most similar system comparison logic where the 
extent of user choice is a core difference between the two national contexts. Overall, the 
analysis shows that citizens appear to embrace user choice, while local government lead-
ers have a more diverse and skeptical approach, focusing on outsourcing and privatization 
as consequences of user choice. In conclusion, the article raises questions about how the 
user choices citizens embrace can be de-coupled from neo-liberal reform strategies, which 
many local government leaders oppose. The article argues that one possible way forward 
is more interactive forms of service delivery, such as co-production or co-creation.  
 
Introduction1 
A lively discussion is currently being waged concerning the sources of legitima-
cy in democratic systems, and it is commonly argued that both input, throughput 
and output need to be considered equal and important dimensions of legitimacy 
(Heinelt, Sweeting & Getimis, 2006). From this perspective, the quality of ser-
vices and the effectiveness of public problem solving represent possible sources 
of legitimacy in addition to the classic modes of democratic participation like 
voting and public discussions about political ends and means (see for example 
Bang, 2007; Crozier, 2010; Rhodes, 1997). It also means that research on de-
mocracy could and should expand into public policy and governance research, 
and vice versa. The goal of this article is to focus on one aspect of service deliv-
ery that has the potential to link democracy and policy together: user choice. 
This reform element has been high on the rhetorical reform agenda, offering a 
potential way to strengthen citizens’ participation at a time when many observers 
argue that classic representative democracy is struggling (Barber, 2003; Rhodes, 
1997). However, we know little about what user choice means in practical terms 
in the context of democratic participation. Few scholars have systematically 
mapped the actual means of influence citizens are exposed to in the Scandinavi-
an countries, and putting user choice and democracy together is not one of the 
most common topics in contemporary political science. 
Although it has been loudly praised by neo-liberalists, user choice is a re-
form element or idea that can be implemented in various ways, depending on for 
instance the ideological position among the actors involved. Following the neo-
liberal or managerial agenda, user choice is mostly associated with an ability to 
choose among a set of public and private providers, and is thereby related to  
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outsourcing and privatization.	  However, user choice can also refer to choosing a 
specific type of service from a given provider. In this case, user choice has some 
linkages to ideas about empowering clients, a core element in the reform agenda 
of “New Public Service” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Some scholars have also 
argued that choice among a fixed set of providers or services is not sufficient to 
give citizens greater influence. In this argument, citizens’ needs can only be fully 
satisfied by an interactive relationship with professionals, an idea commonly 
conceptualized as co-production or co-creation (Pestoff, 2009; Voorberg, Bek-
kers & Tummers, 2015; Fotaki, 2010; Torfing et.al. 2017).  
User choice, or in a more classic scholarly vocabulary  “exit,” allows citi-
zens to influence public service delivery by choosing among alternative provid-
ers or alternative deliveries. Applying various mechanisms of exit in addition to 
voice may have the potential to increase legitimacy and strengthen democracy. 
Over the last twenty to thirty years, exit has mainly become part of the wider 
neoliberal wave of reforms associated with New Public Management or “market-
ization.” The latter is a concept used by Salamon and others to describe the New 
Public Management-inspired transformation of social welfare systems in the 
1980s, when “nonprofit organization have been sucked increasingly into market-
type relations and for-profit firms have steadily expanded their market niche” 
(Salamon, 1993:36). Marketization is generally understood to mean the use of 
market mechanisms to allocate public resources and to measure how and with 
what effect those resources are spent. Marketization will often include develop-
ing a market-like delivery system that allows citizens to choose between alterna-
tive service suppliers (Pierre, 1995:56; Petersen & Hjelmar, 2013; Salamon, 
1993). 
If we see democracy as a mechanism that primarily aims to ensure that indi-
vidual preferences are recognized and, as far as possible, realized, user choice 
has an obvious potential to strengthen democracy. This definition of democracy, 
which has been conceptualized as “an individually centered democratic perspec-
tive” (Olsen, 1990:28), is central to this study. Specifically, this article aims to 
explore the empirical relationship between user choice and democratic participa-
tion: How do citizens evaluate user choice compared to alternative means of 
influence? To what extent is citizens’ evaluation of user choice a direct reflec-
tion of the availability of exit options? And how does the delivery side, the local 
government leaders, understand user choice in the context of participation and 
democracy?  
The empirical context for these questions will be Swedish and Norwegian 
local governments and two service sectors that are important in the Nordic wel-
fare model: Elderly care and primary school education. Though the two coun-
tries are similar in many respects, there is considerable difference in the imple-
mentation of neoliberal reforms (Klausen & Ståhlberg, 1998; Haveri, 2015). The 
following section on the policy contexts is based on research reports and policy 
documents and provides a more detailed overview of the extent and type of user 
choice in the two sectors.  
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The data for this article was collected in two steps: first, a large number of 
citizens were asked to rank a set of ways available to them to influence the ser-
vices delivered by their local government. Second, the article uses data from a 
case study of four municipalities, including in-depth interviews with a set of 
political and administrative leaders.  
In the next section, I will discuss user choice, democracy, and marketization 
in more depth, and this is followed by a section explaining the national contexts 
for user choice in the two policy sectors. The research strategy will be explained 
further in a section on data and methods. The analysis is presented in section 
five, which is followed by a concluding discussion.  
The section on context shows that user choice is on the rise in both elderly 
care and primary school education. However, it is more important in primary 
school education than in elderly care, and is considerably more developed in 
Sweden than in Norway. The analysis is largely based on data from citizen sur-
veys which show that citizens’ assessments of available means of influencing 
policies reflect the availability of exit options in the two countries and sectors. 
However, the analysis also demonstrates that citizens like user choice even when 
legal regulations or political priorities significantly limit this option. The case 
studies, which aim to show how local government leaders understand user 
choice in the context of democracy, clearly illustrate the significant variation 
among individual actors and municipalities in the interpretation of user choice. 
This analysis also demonstrates that for most actors, user choice is strongly 
linked to the neoliberal agenda of outsourcing and private alternatives, and 
thereby taps into one of the strongest political divides in Nordic politics. In con-
clusion, the article argues that more interactive forms of service delivery, for 
example by co-production or co-creation, could be one possible way to de-
couple user choice from privatization. This alternative reform agenda has the 
potential to realize a type of citizen-initiated user choice, while at the same time 
avoiding the controversial effects of managerialism expressed by the majority of 
local government leaders in the study. 
 
Marketization, choice, and democracy 
Most local governments will, whether consciously or not, make decisions about 
how to provide services to their citizens. Some of the options available are clas-
sic in-house production, joint production in partnerships, contracts with other 
governments or outsourcing to private or civil actors (Brown & Potoski, 2003). 
The latter alternative is a central part of marketization, which describes a reform 
wave that has influenced western societies during the last thirty years. In Scandi-
navia, marketization has been expressed in two inter-related trends, contracting 
out and free choice (Petersen & Hjelmar, 2013:5; Haveri, 2015). The first trend 
can be defined as the transfer of the production of a service from the public to 
the private actor, while overall responsibility for funding and supervision is kept 
as a public responsibility (Savas, 1987). The second trend is free choice reforms, 
where citizens enjoy a choice between several providers of a given service or can 
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choose between types of deliveries (Dowding & John, 2012). In principle, free 
choice can be based on a set of public sector options only, but most commonly 
the options made available to citizens will consist of several private providers or 
will include public and private produced services (Dowding & John, 2008). In 
this respect, the two expressions of marketization are practically if not principal-
ly linked together, since outsourcing will typically allow governments to expand 
the options from which citizens can choose.  
In the context of marketization, user choice can be studied from various an-
gles. One of the important approaches departs from neoliberal thinking: it sees  
market-based delivery as an answer to the quest for less government and more 
market (Osborne & Gaebler 1991), and aims to develop new roles for govern-
ment, such as “rowing” instead of “steering” (see Peters, 1997; 2011). In this 
approach, which is anchored in public choice theory, marketization and user 
choice are expected to lead to higher efficiency, better quality, greater diversity, 
and less bureaucracy compared to the classic type of public in-house production 
(see Petersen & Hjelmar, 2013:6). In contrast, critics argue against marketization 
based in a different interpretation of costs and benefits. For example, critics 
point to the significant differences between private sector and public sector val-
ues (Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Peters, Pierre & Røiseland, 2014) and to the 
huge transaction costs related to entering contracts and monitoring contract de-
liveries (Petersen & Hjelmar, 2013; Frederickson, 2005; Kastberg, 2008; Røise-
land, Pierre & Gustavsen, 2015). 
While the above-mentioned research discusses consequences and side ef-
fects of marketization in the context of the public sector or society as a whole, a 
different perspective can be derived from Albert Hirschman’s widely known 
distinctions between “exit, loyalty and voice” (1970). One of Hirschman’s origi-
nal intentions was to improve the private sector by introducing voice as a sup-
plemental instrument to the costumer strategy of exit, which had been the only 
strategy available. In a perfect market, customers are expected to exit (replace 
their provider) as soon as a second alternative is expected to better fit the cus-
tomer’s need in terms of quality or cost. However, following Hirschman, it 
would be much more effective simply to establish a dialogue between the cus-
tomer and the provider. According to Hirschman, a lack of voice makes private 
markets less efficient, and customer feedback will allow markets to function 
better in the longer run (O'Donnell, 1986).  
Democracy was not an explicit dimension in Hirschman’s framework, but 
the conceptualization of exit and voice is relevant if we understand democracy as 
an institutional framework established to allow citizens to, as far as possible, 
realize their individual preferences. Johan P. Olsen refers to this model as the 
“individually-centered perspective,” as opposed to a “societally-centered per-
spective” (Olsen, 1990:28). In this individualistic perspective, the autonomous 
and individual citizen is the main democratic unit. Any means of influence link-
ing the individual citizen to policy outputs can therefore be understood as demo-
cratic participation (see also Sørensen, 2004). One example of this model of 
democracy is economist Charles Tiebout’s “pure theory of public expenditure,” 
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which describes a market-based system of local governments specializing in 
particular services in order to attract inhabitants (1956). Tiebout’s theoretical 
model presupposes that people will reside in the area where local authorities 
offer the services that best respond to citizens’ needs (Pierre & Røiseland, 2016), 
and in that sense they will “vote with their feet.”  
Still, when comparing exit and voice in democratic theory, voice has had a 
much more prominent position. According to Mark Warren, exit has not been 
considered a generic feature of democratic theory and practice, though exit-
based empowerments—understood as individual rights and capacities for exit—
are as central to democracy as votes and voice are (Warren, 2011:683; see also 
Dowding et al., 2000). Several scholars also argue that even if the dichotomy of 
exit and voice has an intuitive appeal to most scholars, the two are closely inter-
related in the sense that a portion of citizens’ exit will strengthen voice (Warren, 
2011; Pierre & Røiseland, 2016). 
The type of exit discussed by Tiebout in 1956 is a radical version in which 
citizens literally vote with their feet by moving away. In a Nordic context, until 
recently few citizens were likely to choose this means of influence. While Tie-
bout presupposes full mobility, most Nordic citizens are “locked in” in their 
local communities by paid work, family, and housing. In addition, the Nordic 
welfare systems do not generally have large differences in quality and deliveries 
across local government borders. However, the introduction of user choice 
means a radical change in the sense that exit has become far more accessible to 
most people. The combination of a Nordic welfare model and user choice also 
means that exit has become more available in the Nordic countries compared to 
elsewhere. Informally, some have even claimed that in terms of choice, the pro-
ponents of neoliberalism like Milton Friedman “would be more at home in 
Stockholm than in Washington, DC.”2 This is due to the funding of service de-
liveries. In many countries, private service deliveries may be better but still more 
expensive, and therefore less available to many citizens (Dowding & John, 
2011), while in the Nordic countries private service deliveries are commonly 
funded as if they were public, for example by vouchers, and are thereby fully 
available to all citizens. Today, therefore, “voting with your feet” does not nec-
essarily imply moving away: it can simply mean a short walk to a different pro-
vider.  
Yet we know little about how different stakeholders in the Nordic countries 
understand exit in the context of democracy, and few scholars have systematized 
and mapped the different arrangements for user choice that exist in different 
countries and sectors. Based in empirical data from Swedish and Norwegian 
local governments, and focusing on elderly care and primary school education, I 
therefore will systematize the extent of user choice in these sectors. This is fol-
lowed by an analysis focusing on the empirical relationship between user choice 
and democratic participation. The analysis is based in part on measurements of 
how citizens evaluate exit compared to voice, and partly on data about a limited 
set of local governments and their leadership.  
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Two neighboring contexts for user choice in elderly care and 
primary school education 
Introduction 
As I will return to in a later section on data and methods, the analysis in this 
article is based on a “most similar systems design” comparison, which in essence 
presupposes overall similarity except in a single key variable, in this case the 
extent of user choice. The two national contexts are Sweden and Norway, and in 
terms of policy context we focus on elderly care and primary education. The aim 
of this section is to explore and explain the way in which user choices in elderly 
care and primary school education have been developed in the two national con-
texts.   
Elderly care and primary school education are the most important local gov-
ernment sectors in both countries, representing a large share of annual budgets. 
They are also real service sectors in the sense that they have the potential to 
become arenas for real choices in terms of different service providers offering 
similar services (e.g. choosing schools or senior homes), or choices among dif-
ferent kinds of deliveries (e.g. type of school or home-based elderly care versus 
senior homes).  
 
Elderly care 
Compared to the most eager reformists, the Scandinavian countries have been 
more cautious in the marketization of elderly care (Meagher & Szebehely, 2013). 
For a long period, user choice was limited to smaller, local initiatives. In these, 
choice could mean establishing a dialogue with users about different kinds of 
deliveries, for example home healthcare services versus residential care or vari-
ous combinations of services, and to a lesser extent about the choice of provider. 
The pure individualized choice between clear alternatives, resembling a free 
market, has been rarer, and has mainly been found in home healthcare in densely 
populated areas. Recently this changed significantly with the introduction of user 
choice by law in Sweden (Kastberg, 2014). 
 
Sweden 
Marketization entered the Swedish agenda in the 1990s, but for a long period 
user choice was only introduced in a few municipalities, which were mainly 
governed by right-wing political coalitions and located in the Stockholm region. 
User choice was first introduced for residential care, a service which is easy to 
expose to competitive tendering. Since the 2000s, the introduction of choice 
models in home healthcare has accelerated, and today the two types of services 
are more or less equal in terms of private providers: 23 percent of home 
healthcare hours and 21 percent of residential care beds are provided by the 
private sector (Erlandsson et al., 2013:47).3 
With the introduction and implementation of new legislation in 2009 (Act on 
System of Choice in the Public Sector, LOV), user choice models have become 
much more widely used. In December 2012, 133 of 290 Swedish municipalities 
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had implemented LOV, primarily in home healthcare services, corresponding to 
45 percent of the municipalities. As a share of the total number of users, this 
corresponds to about 60 percent of the elderly home healthcare users. In addi-
tion, another 42 municipalities have plans to introduce choice models following 
the principles set out in the 2009 legislation (Erlandsson et al., 2013:52). 
According to the Swedish legislation, municipalities need to have a “non-
choice” option, which means the delivery system in place prior to the 2009 re-
form. Still, Swedish legislation does not require local authorities to provide ser-
vices in-house, and about half of the Swedish municipalities that so far have 
implemented the 2009 legislation provide the “non-choice” part of the system 
through a rotation system between authorized private providers, while the re-
maining half base their “non-choice” option on classic in-house, public produc-
tion (Meagher & Szebehely, 2013:258). 
Although still limited, the introduction of user choice has altered Swedish 
elderly care and possibly also the role of municipalities and politicians in this 
field. Providing information about the choices users have has been mentioned as 
one important new task for municipalities (Erlandsson et al., 2013:58). The or-
ganization of competition, the role as a purchaser, and monitoring private service 
providers are also tasks that were rare a generation ago.  
 
Norway 
Marketization has also had some influence in Norway, but to a much lesser ex-
tent than in Sweden. The Norwegian debate has been more rhetorical and sym-
bolic than real: the concepts of competition and user choice have been lauded by 
many politicians, but there are still few private for-profit providers (Vabø et al., 
2013:164). That said, different kinds of purchaser-provider models are common 
as an organizational principle, but for many municipalities only as an organiza-
tional model for in-house production.  
There are few legal rules limiting the freedom Norwegian municipalities 
have to organize elderly care through private service provision. Still, based on 
data from 2010, only four percent of Norwegian municipalities offer user choice 
involving private providers in residential care, while the corresponding figure for 
home healthcare is eight percent (Blåka, Tjerbo & Zeiner, 2012)4. Other data 
sources show that about seven percent of working hours in the care sector are in 
the private sector, and the private sector represents eight percent of total Norwe-
gian care sector costs (Vabø et al., 2013). Norway has a long tradition of elderly 
care institutions run by civil organizations, so a large share of private institutions 
are non-profit. There are also a few Norwegian examples of “public for profit 
institutions,” which are basically public organizations functioning as if they were 
private. These institutions are organized by municipalities, but are given wide 
autonomy including authority over their own finances (Vabø et al., 2013). Final-
ly, there is a mix of different home healthcare providers operating at arm’s 
length from local governments, offering various services paid by the individual 
customer. There is less data available about this private healthcare market, and it 
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is hard to quantify the number of providers or employees involved (Vabø et al., 
2013). 
By 2005, only two Norwegian municipalities had developed pure free choice 
models. Today there are a few more, mainly offering user choice in home 
healthcare, but the ideas and practices of user choice nevertheless remains very 
limited in Norway (Vabø et al., 2013:187).5 
 
Primary school education 
Many countries have deep and long-standing traditions of public and private 
schools existing alongside each other (Dronkers & Avram, 2010). In the Scandi-
navian countries, however, primary education has historically been a welfare 
service organized and funded by the state and supplied by local governments. In 
both Sweden and Norway, primary school education is among the oldest mun-
icipal services, dating back to the establishment of municipalities in the mid-19th 
century. Apart from a small number of religious schools, or schools founded on 
alternative pedagogical practices, primary education was one of the core public 
services at the time marketization and neo-liberalism first made inroads in Scan-
dinavia in the mid-1980s. Faced with these reform trends, Sweden and Norway 
have followed very different paths, and the difference today in terms of market-
ization and user choice is almost extreme. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden carried out a school choice reform in 1991-92, enabling pupils/parents 
to choose between schools. Prior to this user choice reform, pupils were ex-
pected to go to their nearest (public) school, but with the new reform pupils 
could choose between the different public schools in the municipality as well as 
from private schools (called “free schools” or friskolor) (Bunar, 2010:53; Kast-
berg, 2014). The reform introduced a publicly funded voucher system, and the 
law stipulated that private providers had a right to establish and operate schools. 
The municipalities were given the task of organizing the voucher system and 
implementing the choices made by pupils/parents. Promoting user participation 
was a major argument for the 1992 reform, but there were also strong expecta-
tions that competition between schools would raise the overall quality of primary 
schools and primary education. Subsequent research has questioned these ef-
fects, and serious doubts have been raised about the efficiency of the reform and 
about the social side effects in terms of, for instance, social segregation (Bunar, 
2010; Dronkers & Avram, 2010).   
The 1992 reform has led to a substantial increase in private schools. Among 
the current 4,826 primary schools in Sweden, 635 are private (for profit), and 
about 10 percent of all pupils in primary schools are enrolled in private schools 
(Bunar, 2010:53; Skolverket, 2009). However, the choices parents and pupils 
enjoy are subject to some limitations, especially when demand for a specific 
service outstrips supply. If, for example, users are waitlisted for a particularly 
popular school, pupils living in nearby neighborhoods have priority over pupils 
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from outside the area. In these cases, the municipal school administration office 
will distribute the remaining places by drawing lots (Bunar, 2010:53).  
 
Norway 
Turning to Norway, the primary school sector is substantially different from that 
in Sweden. Even if user choice and private schools have been political issues for 
some years (with the right wing parties being the primary advocates for this 
system), Norwegian legislation does not permit private schools except for reli-
gious schools or schools founded on alternative pedagogical practices. Private 
schools are funded through a modified voucher system, which provides grants 
for private schools based on a fixed rate for each pupil. Private schools are not 
allowed to make a profit, and paying a dividend to their owners has been prohib-
ited recently (Vabø et al., 2013:175). Based on this Norwegian framework, 
which largely defines primary education as a publicly produced service, almost 
all primary schools in Norway are public. Of about 3,000 primary schools in 
total, only 165, or less than six percent, are private, and, pursuant to Norwegian 
legislation, by definition non-profit (Ministery of Education, 2012). 
 
Table 2: National Policy Contexts for Elderly Care and Primary Education 
 Norway Sweden 
Elderly care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No specific legislation 
on choice, or limita-
tions on privatizing.  
 
Choice models are 
rarely used (appr. 8% 
of municipalities in 
2012). Mainly for in-
home care services, but 
in some places also for 
home healthcare 
Act on System of 
Choice in the Public 
Sector 2009 (not man-
datory). Free estab-
lishment for providers 
meeting quality crite-
ria. 
 
Choice models are 
relatively widely used 
(piloted since the 
1990s; today used in 
45% of municipalities; 
another 16% have 
decided to implement; 
rapid increase (2012). 
Primary school educa-
tion 
Specific legislation to 
avoid private for-profit 
schools. 
 
Choice models are 
restricted by legisla-
tion. 
Specific legislation 
promoting for-profit 
schools. 
 
Choice models exten-
sively used, and man-
datory.  
Data based on Meagher and Szebehely (2013:262) and Bunar (2010). 
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The low number of private primary schools could indicate that user choice is 
basically absent in the Norwegian primary school sector. But even if pupils are 
normally expected to go to their nearest school, most municipalities allow par-
ents to apply for other schools as well. However, that parents/pupils want to 
choose a different school based in expectations about, for example, pedagogical 
qualities or modernized school buildings, does not give the municipality grounds 
to deviate from the main rule that pupils shall attend their neighborhood school. 
Therefore, the options left to Norwegian parents/pupils are very limited and 
significantly different to those in Sweden.  
The two policy contexts are summarized in table 2. 
 
Data and methods 
On the basis of the differences in national contexts explained above, we can 
conclude that two contexts are almost ideally suited for a “most similar systems 
design” comparison, presupposing overall inter-system similarity and variation 
in a single key intra-system variable, which in this context is user choice (Prze-
worski, 1987; Peters, 2013).  In essence, user choice has been much more devel-
oped in Sweden than in Norway, though more so in primary school education 
than in elderly care. To some extent, one can argue that the two countries are 
mirror images in terms of the distribution of user choice between the two sectors, 
but in total, user choice in Sweden is more developed than in Norway.  
The methodology chosen for this article is a combination of surveys among 
citizens and qualitative interviews with local government leaders. The analysis 
based on survey data collected among Swedish and Norwegian citizens gives us 
some indication about how citizens evaluate user choice in the two sectors in the 
context of democracy. This part of the analysis is based on questions in the ques-
tionnaire that were originally developed to study citizens’ perceptions of input 
versus output-based democratic legitimacy (see further explanations in Gus-
tavsen, Røiseland & Pierre, 2014). These questions asked informants to put 
themselves in a hypothetic situation where they needed to influence the services 
offered by their municipality. The different actions or means that informants 
were asked to evaluate span a wide area, from classic democratic participation 
like voting and personal contact with political or administrative leaders, to con-
tacting service staff, contacting media, demonstrations, and user choice. In the 
context of an individually centered perspective on democracy, as explained 
above, we see these measures as alternative ways of linking individual citizen’s 
preferences to policy outputs. Among the measures, we are particularly interest-
ed in how user choice is evaluated compared to other possible measures that 
have the potential to realize individual preferences.  
That said, the data should be read with caution. To varying degrees, inform-
ants are actual users of the public services in point. When informants are asked 
to put themselves in a hypothetic situation, some will probably answer based in 
real recent experiences, while others will answer based in rather vague ideas 
about service delivery. We likely have a mix of answers based in actual experi-
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ences and answers rooted in ideology, but we are not able to determine the exact 
proportions of the two types of answers. Furthermore, the question used the 
phrase “choosing a service,” which does not distinguish between types of user 
choice. “Choosing a service” can mean anything from choosing a provider of a 
given service, to choosing among different services from a given provider. These 
very different situations are relevant to the research questions, but the data does 
not allow us to distinguish between them. All in all, the survey should be read as 
a rough estimate of citizens’ views. 
The qualitative part of the analysis, which focuses on four municipalities, is 
based on interviews with a set of local government leaders, along with infor-
mation gathered from their websites. This part of the analysis aims to explore 
how user choice is understood in a set of local contexts, and to what extent local 
actors relate user choice to democratic participation. Table 1 gives a brief de-
scription of the different methods and data sources employed in the study.  
 
Table 1: Data sources 
 Norway Sweden 
 Citizen 
survey 
Case stud-
ies 
Citizen 
survey 
Case studies 
Method Survey by 
e-mail 
Qualitative 
interviews 
+ info from 
municipal 
websites 
Survey by 
mail and e-
mail 
Qualitative 
interviews + 
info from mu-
nicipal web-
sites 
N (response 
rate) 
3014 
(10%) 
2 muns., 8 
interviews 
6289 
(52%) 
2 muns., 8 
interviews 
Collected Spring 
2012 
2012-13 Fall 2012 2012-13 
 
The two citizen surveys were organized slightly differently. The Norwegian 
survey was distributed by email via an external contractor (Respons Analyse). 
This survey was a part of a regular omnibus through which potential respondents 
were contacted until a satisfactory number of responses were returned. The final 
sample contains 3,014 responses and has been checked for representativeness in 
terms of age, gender distribution, and the geographical distribution of the general 
population in Norway. The Swedish citizen survey was conducted as part of a 
larger annual omnibus survey organized by the SOM-institute (Gothenburg Uni-
versity), and based in a traditional questionnaire. The relevant section of the 
survey contained exactly the same questions included in the Norwegian survey; 
the only difference is the language used. The Swedish omnibus survey was sent 
to 12,000 respondents, and 6,289 responses were returned (Vernersdotter, 2013). 
As indicated in table 1, the two surveys have significantly different response 
rates, but due to the different methods used by the two contractors, the rates 
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should not be compared. Given the method used by the Norwegian contractor, 
the low response rate would only be a concern to the extent the sample clearly 
differs from the population as a whole, which is not the case. 
In addition to surveys, case studies with in-depth interviews were conducted 
in selected municipalities in Norway and Sweden. These cases were selected in 
order to exemplify variation in terms of the extent to which they have imple-
mented neoliberal reforms (NPM). In order to determine whether municipalities 
had low or high scores on NPM we used a Delphi method, asking leading Scan-
dinavian scholars in New Public Management research to set up a list of the 
“most typical NPM municipalities” in the two countries (information gathered in 
2010). The cases used in this article consist of one municipality in each country 
where NPM has had a significant impact compared to the remaining municipali-
ties, and one where NPM reforms have been modest or missing. Representative-
ness is not a grounding idea for this selection: rather, we intended to maximize 
the cases’ richness in information. In this respect the case studies serve as empir-
ical illustrations and arenas that allow for a more open exploration of user choice 
and democracy.  
In order to generate a deeper understanding of how the local elites under-
stand user choice in the context of democracy, we conducted interviews with 
four political and administrative leaders in each municipality: the mayor6, the 
head of the municipal administration, the head of the elderly care services in the 
municipality, and a general manager for an elderly care institution. No leading 
actor for our second service sector, primary school education, was interviewed, a 
fact that may represent a bias in the analysis that follows. However, the inter-
views covered a broad spectrum of issues related to public service delivery, 
democratic innovation and development, citizen participation, satisfaction with 
service and inclusion in service delivery, as well as ideology and sources of 
legitimacy for local politics.  
 
Analysis 
The section on context made it clear that at the operational policy level, the two 
countries have engaged neo-liberalism and marketization very differently. In 
both countries, different kinds of user choice models have been developed since 
the 1980s, but Sweden has gone much further down this path than Norway. Giv-
en the differences in how citizens in Sweden and Norway have access to user 
choice, one would expect that this difference would surface when we ask citizens 
to evaluate different means they may have at their disposal to influence local 
government policies related to elderly care and primary school education. This 
question will be addressed in the following. 
The data in this part of the analysis consists of two questions that asked citi-
zens to rate a set of possible means they may have at their disposal in order to 
influence the public services delivered. As mentioned in the methodology sec-
tion, this is a rough measure that should be read with caution. However, we 
assume that this method is able to indicate how citizens evaluate user choice as 
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one of several possible ways to influence the realization of citizens’ individual 
preferences in relation to their local government deliveries. Table 3 shows how 
citizens in Sweden and Norway rate a set of means to influence elderly care and 
primary school education, respectively.  
 
Table 3: Percentage of citizens assessing their opportunity to influence public 
service delivery to be “very good” and “fairly good” in relation to a variety of 
means of influence.  N=6289 (Sweden) and 3014 (Norway).7 
 Elderly care Primary school edu-
cation 
 Sweden Norway Sweden Norway 
Voting in elections 27% 32% 24% 30% 
Personal contact with 
political leaders 
20% 27% 21% 26% 
Personal contact with 
administrative staff 
29% 41% 23% 27% 
Personal contact with 
service personnel 
40% 38% 53% 51% 
Contact media 45% 57% 40% 49% 
Demonstrations and 
protests  
21% 22% 24% 28% 
User choice (choosing 
services) 
40% 37% 63% 49% 
 
Table 3 shows that all the listed ways of exerting influence are considered rele-
vant by some or many of the citizens. Personal contact with service staff or ad-
ministrative staff is assessed as relatively important in both countries and in both 
sectors. For primary education, direct contact with service personnel (teachers) is 
more important than direct contact with administrative personnel, whereas in 
elderly care the picture is more mixed. Use of media is also regarded as an im-
portant means in both sectors and both countries. Voting in elections, in contrast, 
is not among the means of exerting influence that are most highly regarded. A 
possible explanation may be that when citizen have a need to influence services 
due to a personal need, voting is a detour strategy compared to the more imme-
diate changes one can achieve through personal contact with someone in the 
local government system.  
The most surprising aspect of table 2 is the assessment of user choice, which 
is clearly considered an important means of influencing local government ser-
vice production. In both sectors and in both countries, having a choice actually 
outweighs the classic forms of participation such as voting. In both countries, the 
difference between voting and choosing services is especially large for primary 
school education. Given the Swedish 1992 reform explained above, this is hardly 
a surprise. It is far less clear why Norwegians seem to let choice outweigh vot-
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ing. For elderly care, about 40 percent of citizens in both countries believe they 
can influence services by exercising choice. Given the limited options offered by 
the Norwegian service delivery system compared to that of Sweden, this is sur-
prising. A possible explanation can be sought in the lack of specificity in the 
questions asked, as we mention in the section on methods. The questions do not 
distinguish between choosing different providers versus choosing different types 
of services, though this is an important distinction in the context of elderly care. 
In recent years, empowering the elderly to stay longer in their homes has been an 
important trend. Choosing services may therefore mean to choose between re-
ceiving care at home versus receiving institutionalized care. Whether citizens 
experience this as a choice and what “choice” means in this context is far from 
clear from the above analysis. 
A second possible explanation for the surprising Norwegian embracement of 
user choice is a lack of information about real opportunities to make choices. 
The above-mentioned political rhetoric about choice may have influenced the 
citizens, and made them believe that user choice is more developed than it really 
is. In this case, table 3 expresses citizens’ normative ideas about how to exert 
influence on policies, rather than an evaluation of the present system. 
The data based on citizen surveys reported in table 3 is more indicative than 
conclusive regarding user choice and democracy. Given the individually cen-
tered perspective on democracy discussed above, the data suggests that user 
choice, or exit, is a type of democratic participation that a large group of citizens 
appreciate. However, based on the reported data it is a challenge to separate 
citizens’ normative ideas about democratic participation from their evaluation of 
participation. This survey data cannot say much about how respondents reason 
around user choice and democracy. A possible next step in this analysis could 
have been in-depth interviews with a set of citizens. As this was not an option 
here, instead I will shift our focus from citizens to those responsible for service 
delivery: the leading actors in a set of local governments. This part of the analy-
sis will illustrate the context in which user choice is discussed and implemented 
and local government leaders’ thoughts about user choice and democracy.  
The analysis of local government leaders is based in four municipalities se-
lected according to the procedure explained in the section on methods. The local 
contexts, such as size and local priorities and how the four municipalities submit 
to marketization reforms, are summarized in table 4.  
As I will return to later, in interviews with these leaders about user choice, 
questions and statements about private service provision and outsourcing soon 
arose. This clearly illustrates the extent to which user choice has been absorbed 
by neoliberalism, despite the various implementations of choice that I mentioned 
in the introduction. Apparently, most local leaders find it hard to discuss user 
choice as a separate reform element, and many of the quotes below illustrate this 
clearly if implicitly.  
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Table 4: Local policy contexts for elderly care and primary school education 
Case A B C D 
National context Swedish Norwe-
gian 
Swedish Norwegian 
Appr. population size (in 
1000s) 
60 180 13 120 
Character-
istics of  
elderly 
care 
Public 
production 
Limited 
 
 
Dominat-
ing 
 
 
Dominat-
ing 
Dominat-
ing  
 
 
Relative 
importance 
of private 
provision 
Very 
important 
Less  
important. 
A few 
senior 
homes run 
by organi-
zations 
Less 
important 
Less/ 
medium 
importance 
User choice 
between 
providers 
Extensive Limited Limited Moderate 
Character-
istics of  
primary 
school  
education 
Public 
production 
Moderate, 
“public 
guaran-
tee”  
 
Dominat-
ing 
 
 
Moderate, 
“public 
guaran-
tee” 
 
Dominat-
ing 
 
 
Relative 
importance 
of private 
provision 
Important Limited 
(“alterna-
tive 
schools”) 
Moderate Limited 
(“alterna-
tive 
schools”) 
User choice 
between 
providers 
Extensive Limited Extensive Limited 
 
Municipality A is located close to a large city in a central part of Sweden. The 
municipality has been governed by a right-wing coalition for many years, and is 
strongly influenced by neo-liberalism. One expression of this is the amount of 
outsourcing: about 54 percent of the municipality’s total budget is spent on pri-
vate contractors, involving all the different parts of municipal service produc-
tion. From the Mayor’s perspective, user choice is clearly related to democracy 
and is even a more important means of exerting influence than classic participa-
tion by voice. The Mayor explained the marketization reforms as a melting pot 
of public and private values and production logics:  
 
Before the marketization of the public sector, citizens were probably 
able to intellectually distinguish between the public sector and the 
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private sector – this is private and I behave in a certain way in rela-
tion to goods and services that I buy in a market, compared to those 
provided by the public services. But now the two are merging (...) 
From my perspective, this is a more well-functioning system, and 
even more democratic than having elections every fourth year (A: 
Mayor). 
 
In terms of the type of local government relationships citizen are looking for, the 
Mayor argues that citizens’ expectations for the public sector have changed 
considerably in recent years. Citizens have and embrace a consumer role vis-à-
vis local government. For the Mayor, this leaves local government leaders with 
few real alternatives to marketization and user choice: 
 
People like to secure a kindergarden spot on the internet, the way 
they would order a book. And they expect to give feedback and make 
complaints online. We need to develop a system able to fill these 
functions. In turn, this means that the central local government lead-
ership needs to be more aware of what is important when we contract 
with external providers (A: Mayor). 
 
While A is among the municipalities that have outsourced a large amount of 
service production, B is located at the opposite end. B, a Norwegian municipali-
ty, has been governed by various political coalitions, most recently a left-wing 
coalition. There are practically no private for-profit providers in municipality B, 
and only a few non-profit providers (including a few alternative primary schools 
established according to the strict Norwegian legislation). A leading politician in 
this municipality clearly stated that this situation was a conscious political 
choice: 
 
We have an ideology saying that welfare is best delivered by the 
state. It is also a question of funding – the large private companies 
are seeking profit –that is basically where the problem lies. We want 
every cent granted to elderly care to become real care, not profit for 
large companies (B: Leading politician).  
 
It is also clear that the political leadership in B does not see user choice as a 
strategy for strengthening democracy. When asked to compare “exit” and 
“voice,” the leading politician in the municipality is clear: 
 
I think that best way one can strengthen democracy is to have people 
vote (B: Leading politician). 
 
User Choice – Blessing or Curse? 
 
 
 
 
43 
However, when we interviewed one of the administrative leaders it became clear 
that there is more pragmatism around these issues on the administrative side of 
municipal management. The administrative head of elderly care in B argued that 
modest reforms aiming to outsource, letting the providers compete, and allowing 
more user choice, would have helped develop quality in public service produc-
tion:  
 
In principle, citizens should be able to choose services independently 
of whether those services are public, or public combined with some 
private services. Furthermore, a system ensuring competition on 
quality within the public sector should be in place. If realized, one 
would develop quality in the public sector as well. So I can’t really 
see the difference in principle as long as the same mechanisms are 
employed (B: Administrative head of elderly care). 
 
Municipality C is a relatively small municipality located in central Sweden, and 
has been governed by a social democratic regime for many years. Service pro-
duction in C is as public as possible, given the Swedish legal framework, and C 
has thus far not implemented the 2009 legislation introducing user choice in 
elderly care. When we interviewed the Mayor, it soon became clear that user 
choice strongly relates to private service production, which is a type of service 
delivery the municipality was strongly opposed to on ideological grounds:  
 
Private delivery of elderly care services – we are strongly against 
that. […] We want someone to be accountable for quality, and we do 
not believe or understand how we can invite tenders in elderly care, 
how to include the soft values like talking to the relatives and so on. 
No, we do not want any private initiatives in the health care service 
in this municipality (C: Mayor). 
 
Having that said, the Mayor makes a distinction between elderly care and pre-
school and primary school, seeing the latter two as better candidates for private 
delivery since these services, in his view, would be monitored more closely by 
the parents:  
 
We do not want private care initiatives in this municipality. On the 
other hand, in primary school and child care we would consider pri-
vate solutions, for example a parent cooperative that creates a pre-
school. For child care in particular I believe there is a stronger guar-
antee that someone will alert us if the service is bad (C: Mayor).  
 
As in municipality B, which also has strong political resistance to private service 
production, in C we find more pragmatic and flexible attitudes among adminis-
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trative leaders. In C, the head of elderly care expresses a personal view that de-
viates from the political signals described above. The head stated that under 
certain circumstances she would welcome user choice and private initiatives:  
 
Well, the fact is that I am employed in a political organization, and 
must follow and implement the decisions made by the politicians. But 
if I was asked to do it myself – with no political instruction – proba-
bly I would have introduced more user choice (C: Adm. head of el-
derly care).  
 
When asked to dwell more on user choice, the same leader argued in favor of a 
moderate user choice model with only a few options, and with the municipality 
as the main option and provider:  
 
I’m not that old, but I can feel it is cumbersome with all these choices 
between telecom and power companies. [...] If I were to have a 
choice it would be fine to choose between the municipality and one 
more. But if I had thirty, then I’m not sure I would have believed it 
was good for me. Probably I would have chosen the municipality, 
since I would then know what I got (C: Adm. head of elderly care). 
 
Norwegian municipality D is located in central Norway, and has been governed 
by a right-wing coalition for many years. D is widely known as one of the most 
neo-liberal municipalities in Norway, but the amount of marketization and pri-
vate service production is still limited, partly due to the Norwegian legal frame-
work, but also due to local priorities. In elderly care, D has one outsourced unit 
run by a private for-profit company, while the municipality runs 16 institutions. 
As mentioned in the policy analysis, there are few restrictions on outsourcing in 
this field, and the potential mix of public and private service providers could 
have flourished. Recently, however, the municipal council agreed on outsourcing 
three institutions for elderly care that are under construction.  
When reflecting on the main role of the municipality, the Mayor seemed to 
argue in a way that resembles the arguments in the marketization discourse re-
ferred to earlier in this article, highlighting the role of public sector as the servant 
of the citizens:  
 
We are here for our citizens, and we have only one job – the produc-
tion of services. Our goal is to develop conditions for mastery and 
quality of life from cradle to grave (D: Mayor).  
 
Even if there is a limited amount of marketization in terms of actual private 
service production and user choice, the chief executive officer in D expressed a 
more radical view than his political counterpart, in reference to elderly care:  
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Well – in my view we should open up for more types of services than 
we have today, expanding the menu for our citizens. We must find 
solutions that fit the actual needs, and citizens must decide if and 
when they want these services. But it is important to ensure that such 
an expansion does not tap into the present capacity in elderly care – 
those who do not have a real choice shall not have a poorer service 
(D: Chief executive). 
 
In the interviews above it is striking how strongly the leaders, and especially 
the political leaders on the left, relate user choice to private service delivery, and 
how they see user choice as choices among a set of private providers. In contrast, 
some informants, and in particular the administrative leaders of elderly care, 
hold the view that user choice can also mean adaptation to the individual prefer-
ences among citizens. A second striking observation is the extreme variation in 
the conception of user choice in the context of democracy: where some see a 
blessing, other see a curse.  
 
Concluding discussion 
The introduction argued that from a theoretical point of view, user choice, or 
more generally “exit,” can be understood as a means of influencing policies. 
Furthermore, in one conception of democracy, user choice is a type of democrat-
ic participation. In recent years, user choice has been framed as a core reform 
element in marketization reforms. However, based in the theoretical literature 
alone, it is hard to predict how citizens and local government leaders in the Nor-
dic context assess user choice and how they relate this form of influence to de-
mocracy. This article has aimed to explore citizens’ evaluation of user choice, 
and how local government leaders understand user choice in the context of de-
mocracy.  
For practical reasons the analysis is delimited to elderly care and primary 
school education, two policy sectors at the core of Nordic local governments that 
from a theoretical point of view would allow extensive use of exit in terms of 
user choice. These two sectors show considerable cross-national variation in the 
implementation of marketization and user choice. Sweden has introduced formal 
user choice in primary schools, and largely in elderly care, while Norway has 
rejected user choice in primary schools, and user choice in elderly care is lim-
ited.  
When asking citizens to assess different kinds of means of exerting influ-
ence in service production, the analysis shows that user choice is highly ranked. 
This exit-based means of exerting influence is more important than classic dem-
ocratic actions such as voting or contacting political leaders, and slightly more 
important than personal contact with service staff. Despite the large differences 
in legal and institutional frameworks, Norwegian citizens rank user choice al-
most as highly as their Swedish neighbors, a fact that does not correspond well 
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with the limited availability of user choice in Norway. The present study cannot 
fully explain this, and this lack of correspondence must be explored further in 
future research.  
The final step in the analysis was to explore how local government leaders 
in the two countries relate marketization and choice to democracy. We chose the 
four cases, or municipalities, to display a variation in neoliberal orientation. This 
intended variation is clearly expressed in the material. There is almost an ex-
treme variation in the degree to which the leaders in these four municipalities see 
a link between user choice and democracy. Where some see user choice as an 
important extension of democracy, others see it as a threat to democracy. In this 
respect, user choice is embedded in a confrontation between the two perspectives 
mentioned in the theoretical part: the “individually centered” versus the “society 
centered” perspective on democracy.  
However, it is not necessarily user choice itself that is the difficult issue for 
the leaders, but rather the fact that for local leaders, user choice is conceptually 
and practically linked to privatization and outsourcing – which is one of the most 
controversial issues in Scandinavian politics. Even if administrative leaders 
appear to have a more pragmatic and flexible perspective on marketization and 
user choice than their political counterparts, the overall impression still is that 
user choice is a neo-liberal idea. In turn, this suggests that the conceptual rela-
tionship between marketization and democracy is highly influenced by ideology 
and political party affiliation.  
Relating some of these observations to the above theoretical discussion 
about voice and exit, the results of the citizen survey coincide with the argument 
that from a democratic point of view, exit is as significant as voice in terms of 
promoting responsiveness among local decision makers. Citizens enjoy having a 
choice, and perhaps they find voting and similar classic types of democratic 
participation to be slower and strategies that detour more in the quest to realize 
their individual preferences. Given that many countries are faced with challenges 
regarding the legitimacy of local governments (Selle & Østerud, 2006; Amnå, 
2006; Heinelt, Sweeting & Getimis, 2006), one can argue that this request for 
more user choice needs to be taken seriously. On the other hand, we have also 
seen the strong resistance among local government leaders, who tend to see 
privatization as an unavoidable consequence of introducing user choice. How 
can these different positions meet? 
What is seemingly lacking in the Nordic discourse, is the option of introdu-
cing user choice among different deliveries while not, at the same time, outsour-
cing to private providers. Introducing more interactive forms of service delivery 
would be one possible way forward. One example is the fast-growing literature 
on co-production and co-creation, which offer a new type of interface between 
citizens and service providers (Torfing, Sørensen & Røiseland, 2017). The idea  
behind these practices is to mobilize the experiences, resources, and ideas of a 
plurality of public and private actors in the creation of public solutions, and to 
involve citizens actively in providing public welfare services and in solving 
social and political problems and challenges (Bovaird, 2007; Voorberg, Bekkers 
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& Tummers, 2015).  Practical and principled explorations of how to realize the 
quest for user choice in a context of co-production rather than marketization 
therefore is a future research task with possible contributions to legitimacy and 
democracy (Fledderus, Brandsen & Honingh, 2014; Dunston et al., 2009). 
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Note 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at NORKOM – the annual Nordic conference on 
local government research - held in Odense in November 2014. I am grateful for the comments from 
the NORKOM participants, as well as the journals reviewers’ helpful suggestions and constructive 
critique. I also appreciate the collaboration with Jon Pierre and Annelin Gustavsen, both involved in 
the research project that led to this article. 
2 “The Nordic countries – The next supermodel”, The Economist February 2nd 2013. 
3 See also table in Meagher and Szebehely (2013:244). 
4 These data cover about 70 percent of Norwegian municipalities. 
5 See also table in Vabø et al. (2013:244). 
6 I use “mayor” as a common term for the Norwegian “Ordfører” and the Swedish “Ordförande i 
kommunstyrelsen.” These two positions are the leading political positions in municipalities in the 
two countries, and are positions that are won in elections by the political majority. In one of the 
cases, we had to replace one mayor with a leading full-time politician from the mayor’s political 
party, as the mayor in question was on sick leave.  
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7 The questions were phrased as follows:  
- Imagine that you or someone in your close family need help from the municipal elderly 
care and support services. How would you rate your opportunities to influence services 
for the elderly through the following actions?  
- Imagine that you have children in primary school, how would you rate your opportuni-
ties to influence primary school education through the following actions? 
